



Energy Supply Disruption

STATE HAZARD PLAN

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

Energy Policy Western Australia

APPROVED BY

State Emergency Management
Committee

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Amendments Table

Date	Details	Amended by
7 September 2018	State Hazard Plan – Energy Supply Disruption Version 1.00: Amalgamation and update of: Westplan – Gas Supply Disruption, Westplan – Liquid Fuel Supply Disruption and Westplan – Electricity Supply Disruption into State Hazard Plan – Energy Supply Disruption ; new State Hazard Plan format; statement of fact changes; removal of duplication with the State Emergency Management (EM) Plan; inclusion of assurance activities and capability baseline information; machinery of Government changes; removal of background information including disruption vulnerabilities; alignment of gas and fuel notification requirements with the electricity model; clarification regarding HMA involvement at the Operational Area level; and combined Alert Warning System for all three hazards.	Public Utilities Office
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December 2020	Version 01.03 – Amendments approved by SEMC (Resolution Number 84/2020) as per amendments table v02.06 .	SEMC Business Unit
December 2021	Version 2.00 - Accessibility redesign approved by SEMC (Resolution Number 32/2021). Amendments made to update statement of fact changes and improve accessibility as per State emergency management documents amendments table December 2021 .	SEMC Business Unit
December 2022	Version 2.01 - Amendments approved by SEMC Executive Officer (Resolution Number 17/2021). Statement of fact changes and updated hyperlinks to new SEMC website as per amendments table December 2022 .	SEMC Business Unit
October 2023	Version 2.02 - Consequential amendments approved by SEMC to reflect change in terminology from 'welfare' to 'emergency relief and support' and related terms (resolution number 77/2023) and statement of fact and accessibility amendments approved by the SEMC Executive Officer (resolution number 17/2021) outlined in State EM documents amendments table October 2023 .	SEMC Business Unit
March 2024	Version 2.03 - SEMC approved an extension to the comprehensive review of the plan from December 2023 to March 2024 (resolution number 100/2023) and from March 2024 to August 2024 (resolution number 15/2024).	SEMC Business Unit
August 2024	Version 2.04 - Amendments approved by SEMC (Resolution Number xx/2024) following comprehensive review, as per State EM documents amendments table August 2024 .	SEMC Business Unit

The SEMC acknowledges the Aboriginal peoples throughout the state of Western Australia as the Traditional Custodians of the lands where we live, work and volunteer. We recognise Aboriginal peoples' continued connection to land, waters and community, and pay our respects to Elders both past and present.

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All of the State emergency management legislation and documents can be accessed via the [State Emergency Management Framework](#) page of the State Emergency Management Committee webpage.

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A dark, blue-toned photograph of a rocky canyon. A waterfall is visible in the center-right, cascading over layered rock formations. The canyon walls are steep and show distinct horizontal geological strata. The overall mood is mysterious and dramatic.

Part One:

Introduction

The State Hazard Plan for Energy Supply Disruption (the Plan) provides an overview of the arrangements for the emergency management of the hazards of gas, liquid fuel and electricity disruptions in Western Australia.

This Plan should be read in conjunction with the State Emergency Management Plan.

The Plan refers to a range of existing plans and documents relating to incident and emergency management but does not reproduce such information, instead providing directions to where the applicable publications can be located.

The Coordinator of Energy is the Hazard Management Agency (HMA) for gas, liquid fuel and electricity supply disruptions.

1.1 Scope

This Plan covers the emergency management arrangements within the geographic boundaries of Western Australia for the hazards of gas, liquid fuel and electricity supply disruption. It describes prevention/mitigation of, preparedness for, the response to, and the initiation of recovery arrangements following a disruption, or simultaneous disruptions to energy supplies.

This plan does not detail or prescribe responses for specific energy production or transmission assets.

The arrangements detailed in this Plan are applied both in anticipation of, and in response to, an incident within the supply chain. The majority of the information in this Plan applies to all three hazards. Where aspects are hazard specific, there are individual subsections to differentiate between the energy types.

1.2 Hazard Definition and Profile

"Energy supply disruption" refers to the disruption of the energy types identified in the *Emergency Management Regulations 2006* (detailed below),

which have the potential to have a negative impact on the economic and societal wellbeing of the Western Australian community.

1.2.1 Gas and Liquid Fuel

Under the *Emergency Management Regulations 2006* (regulation 15(k)), the following event, situation or condition is described as a hazard –

"loss of or interruption to the supply of natural gas, or liquid fuel as defined in the *Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984* (Commonwealth) section 3(1), that is capable of causing or resulting in loss of life, prejudice to the safety, or harm to the health, of a person".

"Gas Supply Disruption", for the purposes of establishing the emergency management arrangements in this Plan, is a loss of or interruption to the supply of natural gas that will have a significant impact on the community, energy infrastructure, essential services and domestic gas supply systems.

A significant gas supply disruption can reduce the supply of gas to industry, the community and critical energy infrastructure. This has the potential to constrain the provision of a range of services (e.g. electricity, gas, transport fuels, hospital supplies etc.), threatening the health and safety of the community.

As mentioned above, the definition of "liquid fuel", for the purposes of this Plan, is derived from the *Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984* (Commonwealth) and includes Liquefied Petroleum Gas.

For the purposes of establishing the emergency management arrangements under this Plan, "Liquid Fuel Supply Disruption" refers to a loss of, or interruption to, the supply of a liquid fuel that will have significant societal and economic impact on Western Australia and the ongoing provision of essential services.

A significant liquid fuel supply disruption can constrain the amount of fuel available to industry, the community and critical energy infrastructure.

As the liquid fuels market is diverse with many principal and ancillary products being marketed, two distinct classes of liquid fuels have been categorised to guide the HMA's response: Primary and Secondary fuel types.

"Primary" fuel types have been identified as possessing the largest share of the market, or delivering the greatest benefit to Western Australian community and economy. These are Diesel, Unleaded Petrol 91 (ULP91), Aviation fuels and Bunker (ships), which are essential for a functioning society and economy.

"Secondary" fuel types have been assessed as not specifically required for the effective functioning of society. Premium Fuels (PULP 95, 98 RON), Ethanol and Bio Fuels, and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) fall under this category, given that they are specialty fuels and less utilised.

1.2.2 Electricity

Under the *Emergency Management Regulations 2006* (regulation 15(1)), "electricity supply disruption" is defined as "loss of or interruption to the supply of electricity that is capable of causing or resulting in loss of life, prejudice to the safety, or harm to the health, of a person."

The arrangements within this Plan recognise the inherent nature of electricity networks, which result in the frequent and intermittent loss of energy to homes, business premises and suburbs. Management of minor outages are part of Western Power and Horizon Power's business as usual arrangements. Consequently, there is a high threshold applied to what constitutes an electricity supply disruption event.

The HMA will be guided by its risk analysis tool, the Alert Warning System (outlined in section 4.2.4), and the State's Core Objectives (outlined in section 4.2.3) when determining whether to activate the response arrangements within this Plan.

Notes

¹ *Emergency Management Regulations 2006* regulation 23(B) – includes prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.

1.2.3 Total Energy Supply Disruption

The three energy types are interconnected and interdependent on each other.

The consequential effect may be that a disruption of one energy type can result in the disruption of another. Where all three energy types are disrupted, the incident can be considered a total "Energy Supply Disruption".

Further information on gas, liquid fuel and electricity disruption can be found at: [wa.gov.au/organisation/energy-policy-wa/emergency-management](https://www.wa.gov.au/organisation/energy-policy-wa/emergency-management).

1.3 Organisational Roles and Responsibilities

The Coordinator of Energy is the HMA for gas, liquid fuels and electricity supply disruptions – responsible for the emergency management of significant energy supply disruptions.¹

The Department of Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety's sub-department, Energy Policy WA performs the administration of many aspects of the HMA's role under their direction. Energy Policy WA is responsible for the development, implementation and revision of this Plan, in consultation with key stakeholders. It also monitors the prevention frameworks that underpin the security of the energy supply chains.

Energy supply disruptions and the associated planning activities are managed in collaboration with industry. The responsibilities outlined within this Plan take into consideration both the mandated and voluntary relationships to the hazard.

Where appropriate, it is recommended that each agency or organisation with a role or responsibility under this Plan has operational procedures that detail that agency's response arrangements in accordance with this Plan. These arrangements should be complementary to their existing operational procedures that enable them to carry out their roles and any responsibilities

under the State Emergency Management Plan.

Information regarding the roles and responsibilities of relevant organisations and agencies under this Plan are detailed in Appendix C and Appendix D.

1.4 Related Documents and Legislation

Energy Policy WA maintains an Energy Hazards Operations Plan (Energy Policy WA). This plan is not public and contains information on response to energy supply disruptions in much greater detail than this State Hazard Plan. Agencies and industry organisations with roles and responsibilities for energy supply disruption listed in Appendix C of this document should contact Energy Policy WA to obtain a copy of the Operations Plan.

Documents, legislation and codes relevant to this Plan include, but are not limited to:

All Hazards

- Energy Hazards Operations Plan (Energy Policy WA)
- *Fuel Energy and Power Resources Act 1972*
- *Energy Operators (Powers) Act 1979*
- *Energy Coordination Act 1994*
- *Emergency Management Act 2005*
- *Emergency Management Regulations 2006*
- *Dangerous Goods Safety Act 2004*
- *Occupational Safety and Health Act 2020.*

Gas

- *Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006* (Commonwealth)
- *Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulations 2009* (Commonwealth)

- *Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982*
- *Petroleum Pipelines Act 1969*
- *Gas Supply (Gas Quality Specifications) Regulations 2010*
- *Gas Standards (Gas Supply and System Safety) Regulations 2000.*

Liquid Fuel

- *Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984* (Commonwealth)
- *Dangerous Goods Safety (General) Regulations 2007*
- *Dangerous Goods Safety (Storage and Handling of Non-Explosives) Regulations 2007*
- *Dangerous Goods Safety (Major Hazard Facilities) Regulations 2007*
- *Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail (7.8 Ed – 2022)*
- *Port Authorities Act 1999*
- *Navigation Act 2012* (Commonwealth)
- SOLAS: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
- *Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006* (Commonwealth)
- *Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Safety) Regulations 2009* (Commonwealth)
- *Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003* (Commonwealth)
- National Liquid Fuel Emergency Response Plan (NLFERP) (Commonwealth)
- *Environmental Protection (Petrol) Regulations 1999.*

Electricity

- *Electricity Industry Act 2004*
- *Electricity (Network Safety) Regulations 2015*
- *Electricity Act 1945*
- *Electricity Regulations 1947*
- *Electricity (Licensing) Regulations 1991*
- *Code of Conduct for the Supply of Electricity to Small Use Customers 2022*
- *Electricity Industry (Wholesale Electricity Market) Regulations 2004*
- *Electricity Industry (Network Quality and Reliability of Supply) Code 2005*
- *Economic Regulation Authority (Electricity Networks Access Funding) Regulations 2012.*

1.5 Activities Informing the Assurance Process

Assurance activities undertaken by the HMA are detailed below.

Table 1: Hazard Management Agency assurance activities

Area	Activities	Tools
Continual Improvement	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Hot/Cold DebriefsExercise ProgramPost-Exercise AnalysesPost-Incident AnalysesIndustry workshopsCollaboration with other government agencies on aspects of market risk	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Lessons/Actions RegisterAnnual Report
Staff Readiness	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Testing, training and exercising regimeCrisis Information Management System trainingDeliver/participate in exercisesState and national emergency management committee(s) participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Operations team formally qualified in emergency management and Public Safety
Consultation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">All processes/actions/analyses incorporate consultation with industry and government	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Record keeping of feedback and actions taken

The continual improvement activities inform areas where the HMA can improve the arrangements in this Plan. Consultation is a key aspect of assurance that ensures all aspects of emergency management are being considered and not just from the perspective of the HMA. The tools listed above are intended to ensure that all improvements identified are then actioned by the HMA.



Part Two:

**Prevention and
Mitigation**

As the HMA, the Coordinator of Energy is responsible for undertaking prevention and/or mitigation activities in relation to the emergency management of gas, liquid fuel and electricity supply disruptions. However, most prevention and mitigation activities fall under the legislative responsibility of private industry, State-owned electricity corporations or other government agencies.

There are multiple agencies and organisations who contribute to preventing and mitigating supply disruptions depending on the energy source and location in the supply chain. The HMA maintains an awareness of all legislation and associated activities relevant to the reduction of the risks (directly or indirectly) of a supply disruption.

Large consumers of energy have a role to play in mitigation through development of contingency plans to deal with disruptions. For example, businesses that are heavily reliant on gas, fuel or electricity should have business continuity plans in place with strategies to address a supply disruption should it occur.

Residential customers should also take responsibility for assessing their energy requirements and the extent to which they need to have contingency plans in place. However, this Plan recognises that consumers have differing levels of capability to implement mitigation activities. For example, businesses will usually have greater capability than residential customers, with a further reduction likely for at-risk persons. Further detail is provided at: [wa.gov.au/organisation/energy-policy-wa/emergency-management](https://www.wa.gov.au/organisation/energy-policy-wa/emergency-management).

2.1 Gas Supply Safety and Security

The basis for regulating Western Australia's offshore petroleum industry is a safety case approach, which has been introduced nationally. It is based on the premise that the ongoing management of safety is the responsibility of the operator, not the regulator. This approach has shown to be the most effective method for maintaining safety standards in complex, high-risk activities such as hydrocarbon processing facilities.

A safety case is a document that describes a facility, provides details on the hazards and risks associated with that facility, and outlines a Safety Management System designed to minimise those risks. An operator must regularly inspect its facilities, assess risks, provide adequate safety training, and comply with every aspect of its safety case.

2.1.1 National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environment Management Authority

The National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environment Management Authority (NOPSEMA) has the responsibility for the regulation of safety and structural integrity of pipelines situated in Commonwealth offshore waters.

2.1.2 Department of Energy, Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety

The Department of Energy, Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety (DEMIRS) – WorkSafe Group oversees safety regulation of pipelines located in Western Australian coastal waters (from the three nautical mile limit to the mean low watermark on the mainland). This division also looks after the safety and structural integrity of onshore pipelines – both on the mainland and any islands.

These responsibilities apply to high pressure transmission pipelines.

2.1.3 DEMIRS – EnergySafety Division

DEMIRS – EnergySafety Division has responsibility for the safety regulation of all low-pressure distribution networks that supply gas to commercial and residential customers in the State.

2.1.4 The Australian Energy Market Operator

In the gas sphere, the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) is responsible for Gas Services Information including the Gas Bulletin Board, and the publication of the annual Gas Statement of Opportunities. These services provide timely data to the market.

2.2 Liquid Fuels Supply Safety and Security

Strategies to prevent and mitigate liquid fuel supply disruptions relate primarily to the regulation of safety. This is because risks associated with safety are able to be identified and either removed or reduced to acceptable levels, unlike geopolitical instability or industrial disputes.

The approach is based on the premise that the ongoing management of safety is the responsibility of the operator. Placing responsibility for safety with an operator has been shown to be the most effective method for maintaining safety standards in complex, high-risk activities such as refineries and petroleum storage facilities.

2.2.1 International Maritime Organisation

The International Maritime Organisation has established stringent standards for all aspects of maritime safety with the key authority being the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). This Convention covers vessel design, pilotage and the transport of dangerous goods in international waters.

2.2.2 Australian Maritime Safety Authority

The requirements of the SOLAS convention are enforced by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (also known as AMSA) once a ship moves into Australian waters through the *Navigation Act 2012*.

2.2.3 DEMIRS – WorkSafe Group

WorkSafe regulates occupational health and safety requirements aimed at the elimination of incidents resulting in injuries or harm to employees, which in turn can assist with the reduction of accidents that could cause significant down-time at generation facilities, transmission and distribution infrastructure, and at individual customer locations.

Petroleum products are classed as a Class 3 – Flammable Liquid under the Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail and, once unloaded from the ship, any facilities they pass through are regulated

by the Resources Safety Division under the *Dangerous Goods Safety Act 2004*. This legislation has a suite of regulations and mandatory codes of practice that ensure there are controls in place across the entirety of the supply chain. This approach minimises risk and therefore the likelihood of any accidents that could cause a disruption to the supply of fuel in the State.

Where a facility that handles dangerous goods in quantities that meet a legislated threshold, a further set of regulations – the *Dangerous Goods Safety (Major Hazard Facilities) Regulations 2007* – will apply. Operators of a Major Hazard Facility must conduct a risk assessment, create a comprehensive safety management system for any hazards or risks identified and develop a safety report detailing the previous two items.

Notable Major Hazard Facilities in Western Australia include the BP Kwinana Major Import Terminal and the Coogee Chemicals terminal.

2.2.4 Fair Work Commission and Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission

The Fair Work Commission and Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission enable negotiation and arbitration to continue when negotiations between employers and employees stall or break down.

In extreme instances, these Commissions may rule strike action illegal if it was to threaten the security and economic welfare of the community, for example in relation to a significant liquid fuel supply disruption.

2.3 Electricity Supply Safety and Security

There are multiple legislative requirements and commercial imperatives that drive the supply disruption prevention and mitigation strategies in the electricity sector.

The government has established a series of mandated requirements for the electricity industry. The primary instrument is the *Electricity Industry (Network Quality and Reliability of Supply) Code 2005* (reliability code).

This Code determines the level of supply downtime network operators can have in any given year.

In order to meet the requirements of the reliability code, network operators implement engineering solutions to ensure that the infrastructure design and build is appropriate to the level of risk in the region.

Electricity infrastructure operators also conduct a maintenance and replacement program to ensure that assets remain fit for service. After any incident that impacts their networks, assets are assessed, cleaned and restored to a serviceable condition, if possible.

Energy market participants are heavily regulated, including but not limited to, the *Electricity (Network Safety) Regulations 2015* requiring a network operator to have a safety management system that complies with AS 55772013. Participants are governed by technical rules and market mechanisms driving consideration of redundancy and contingency actions with the net effect of minimising incidents.

2.3.1 Economic Regulation Authority

This agency has a role in regulating the entire electricity supply chain across generation, transmission and retail markets. This includes licensing, reliability reporting, network access, and the conduct of industry participants.

2.3.2 DEMIRS – EnergySafety

The EnergySafety division administers the safety regulation of supply system connections, which ensures distribution and transmission lines are built and maintained at a high standard, increasing reliability of supply.

This division also looks after certification of electrical works undertaken at the micro level. This contributes to reducing the number of occurrences of electrical failure and accidents that might impact on the supply of electricity to individual customers.

2.3.4 AEMO

The AEMO operates the Wholesale Electricity Market under rules set out in the *Electricity Industry (Wholesale Electricity Market) Regulations 2004* and facilitates a more transparent market for generators and retailers to buy and sell energy. One objective of these rules, amongst others, is to promote safe and reliable production and supply of electricity and electricity services in the South West Interconnected System.

The AEMO also undertakes a system management role to ensure that the South West Interconnected System maintains stable and secure supply. The AEMO manages generation capacity and dispatch to ensure the frequency and the voltage of the power system remain within acceptable limits.

2.3.5 Pilbara Independent System Operator

The Pilbara Independent System Operator Company (also known as Pilbara ISOCo) is responsible for maintaining and improving system security, managing essential system services and facilitating network coordination and planning in the North West Interconnected System.

Pilbara ISOCo acts as the Pilbara independent system operator in accordance with the Pilbara networks rules which were made by the Minister for Energy under Part 8A of the *Electricity Industry Act 2004*.

The Pilbara ISOCo was incorporated in June 2021 and as of December 2021 is building capability to undertake these functions.



Part Three:

Preparedness

3.1 Responsibility for Preparedness

As the HMA, the Coordinator of Energy is responsible for coordinating preparedness activities for the management of energy supply disruption incidents. As part of this, the Coordinator of Energy is accountable for the development of plans and arrangements to manage emergencies.

Agencies and organisations should also have strategies and operational plans in place to prepare for energy supply disruptions and consequential emergency response as part of prudent business continuity planning.

3.2 Capability Baseline

To assist with planning and preparing for responses to disruptions to energy supply, agencies and organisations should consider the following capability baselines as credible scenarios for the provision of required support to the community. These scenarios are based on historic Western Australian experience but are not indicative of a worst-case scenario.

3.2.1 Gas Supply Disruption

A protracted loss of a significant portion of the State's gas supply causing long-term shortages of gas, as well as pressure on supply of fuel and electricity. Significant impact to the State's economy and delivery of emergency and essential services, as well as availability of gas for residential customers.

[This scenario is based on the 2008 Varanus Island explosion that reduced Western Australia's domestic gas supply by 30% for two months. Subsequent supply restoration was a slow process, taking just under a year to return to full capacity.]

3.2.2 Liquid Fuel Supply Disruption

Shortage of one or more Primary liquid fuel types affecting metropolitan and regional areas of the State for up to two weeks or a severe shortage of one Primary liquid fuel type for up to one week. Significant impact to fuel-reliant

industry, emergency and essential service vehicles as well as the general population.

[This scenario reflects the 2014 Perth diesel shortage, which resulted in constrained supply within the Wheatbelt (during seeding season) for several weeks and one of every three Perth metropolitan service stations being without diesel for four days.]

3.2.3 Electricity Supply Disruption

Widespread extended blackouts significantly affecting service provision by damage multiple essential service providers for a period in excess of 36 hours.

[This scenario is based on the January 2024 Wheatbelt and Goldfields storms that caused widespread electricity network damage and extended blackouts across large regional areas, affecting more than 35,000 customers at peak.]

3.3 Planning and Arrangements

In order to deliver a successful response to a significant energy supply disruption, it is essential that energy sector participants have robust internal emergency response plans that are interoperable with the State Emergency Management Arrangements. This allows for the most efficient restoration of supply, whilst ensuring that any directions from the HMA can be adhered to.

To facilitate an effective State emergency response in collaboration with industry, the Energy Policy WA maintains the WA Energy Hazards Operations Plan that steps out the principles, processes and procedures to be followed. This document is restricted to agencies and organisations with a role in the response to an emergency.

3.3.1 At-Risk Persons

During an incident, affected at-risk persons will be identified through consultation with members of the relevant State Support Group or Operational Area Support Group (OASG). The State Support Group or OASG

will include agencies responsible for the protection of at-risk sectors of the community such as:

- customers reliant on life support equipment
- customers with thermoregulatory disorders
- preschool and school children separated from parents
- aged care facility residents, and the independent elderly
- remote aboriginal and other isolated communities.

Customers with life support equipment requirements are strongly advised to register their location and status with their energy retailer.

3.3.2 Resources

Resourcing requirements will need to match the severity of an incident. This is consistent with the emergency management principle of a graduated response. The HMA maintains a base level of “business as usual” human resources. Where the HMA has assessed a requirement for additional resources, the HMA will draw upon other HMA, industry and government stakeholders to resource personnel for the control structure required for an incident.

To coordinate information during the response, the HMA utilises an online crisis information management system, accessible anywhere internet connectivity is available.

Organisations with roles and responsibilities identified in Appendix C of this Plan should ensure that they have the necessary and appropriate resources in place to meet their obligations during an energy supply disruption.

3.4 Community Information and Education

The HMA, in collaboration with other relevant agencies and organisations, will develop communication strategies to educate and advise the public during the response to energy supply disruptions.

Links to existing information that may assist in improving their resilience

prior to energy supply disruption can be found in Appendix G.

3.5 Assistance Arrangements with Other Jurisdictions

3.5.1 Gas and Electricity

Interstate Assistance: Given the geographic isolation of Western Australia’s gas and electricity supply systems, assistance from, or to, other jurisdictions during the disruption of gas or electricity supply is likely to be limited to logistical support in exceptional circumstances.

Coordination/Control Arrangements: Western Australia is a member of the National Gas Emergency Response Advisory Committee (NGERAC). In the event of a Western Australian gas emergency response, strategic advice and support may be available at a Commonwealth level.

International Assistance: Not applicable.

3.5.2 Liquid Fuels

Interstate Assistance: Given the geographic isolation of Western Australia’s liquid fuel supply network, assistance from or to other jurisdictions during a disruption of liquid fuel supply is likely to be limited to logistical support in exceptional circumstances.

Coordination/Control Arrangements: Western Australia is represented on the National Oil Supplies Emergency Committee (NOSEC). In the event of a National Liquid Fuel Emergency, strategic management and additional legislative powers may be available at a Commonwealth level.

Further information on the arrangements and its relationship to Western Australia’s response can be found in Appendix E.

International Assistance: International assistance will be coordinated by the Chair of NOSEC. The Chair is Australia’s representative to the [International Energy Agency](#).

A dark, blue-toned photograph of a rocky canyon. The rock walls are layered and textured, with a small waterfall cascading down the right side into a pool of water at the bottom. The overall mood is somber and dramatic.

Part Four:

Response

4.1 Responsibility for Response

The Coordinator of Energy, as the HMA, is responsible for managing the emergency responses to the energy supply disruptions of:

- Gas
- Liquid Fuel
- Electricity.

There are different emergency response arrangements for energy supply disruptions, as compared to other prescribed hazards under the emergency management legislation. This section outlines how the arrangements operate.

The Operator(s) of the affected energy infrastructure are the first responders to energy supply disruption incidents and remain responsible for reparation/restoration efforts (similar to a “Controlling Agency” under the State Emergency Management Framework).

The HMA is responsible for the overall strategic coordination of the response to the incident and the subsequent consequence management.

An example of a scenario where these arrangements would be implemented would be if damage were to occur to a major pipeline such as the Dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline. The operator of the pipeline would be responsible for fixing the pipeline. However, the loss of gas may affect multiple population centres throughout the State so the HMA would be responsible for coordinating the response of all market participants and consequence management across the affected areas.

4.2 Response Arrangements

This section details the strategic response and the control structure imposed by the HMA during an incident.

4.2.1 Notifications – Reporting Incidents to the HMA

Energy market participants (such as infrastructure operators and retailers) report impending or actual energy supply disruptions to the HMA via the Energy Policy WA's Emergency Management Team.

The indicators listed in Table 2 assist in determining which incidents are a “Notifiable Incident”.

Market participants must notify the HMA if any of these indicators are present. This reporting process should be incorporated into their respective emergency plans.

As early notification and open communication are key to a successful response, there are no barriers to notification of the HMA under other circumstances should a participant choose to do so.

Table 2: Notifiable Incidents

Type	Notification Criteria
Pre-Emptive Notification	<p>Hazards (Prescribed²)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• A natural hazard is likely to have an impact on key system infrastructure and/or large portion of the community; or• A man-made hazard that, either directly or indirectly, is likely to disrupt the effective operating of a supply system; and• An Emergency Management Team (EMT) or equivalent³ is convened by the energy market participant. <p>Market Risk</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Performance of key asset(s) altering the fundamental risk profile of the system or portion of the system; or• Excessive demand day(s) where supply will not meet demand; or• Risk of market failure(s) increases; and• Alternative arrangements and/or estimated reparation times do not negate risk.
Reactive Notification	<p>Supply Disruption</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Key supply system asset(s) are affected, or will be affected; or• Assets and/or areas of societal importance are affected; or• High media or political interest; and• An EMT (or equivalent) is convened by the energy market participant and their emergency preparations have commenced.

Notes

2 A prescribed hazard is one that is established under the emergency management legislation. The HMA responsible for the initiating hazard will maintain overall control for the emergency response to that hazard, as long as it is active.

3 An EMT or equivalent (such as an Incident Management Team) is the emergency team that an energy market participant forms to deal with an incident within their own business operations.

The affected energy market participant should include the following information when notifying the HMA:

- the nature, location and time of the incident
- the immediate and forecast impact on the quantity and type of energy source affected
- implications for the reliability of the infrastructure concerned (where applicable)
- current and short term market strategy.

Where the HMA has assessed that there is a requirement for a response, the HMA is responsible for notifying:

- The Minister for Energy
- The State Emergency Coordinator
- Agencies with roles and responsibilities in Appendix C.

Nothing in this Plan detracts from the rights and/or responsibilities of the affected asset operator to communicate with their shareholders and/or stakeholders during an incident. Asset operators may have additional regulatory reporting obligations and owners/customers to manage.

4.2.2 Activation of Response Arrangements

The response arrangements within this Plan are activated on the receipt of notification of an incident as described in Table 2: Notifiable Incidents.

The HMA will assess the risk and severity of the energy supply disruption incident to determine its alert status/incident level and facilitate an appropriate level of response.

4.2.3 Levels of Response

The HMA has established the following incident levels:

- Level 0: Elevated risk - potential for Acute Supply Disruption. Level 0 incidents are monitored internally by the HMA with no effect on the community.
- Level 1: High risk of Acute Supply Disruption
- Level 2: Actual or imminent Acute Supply Disruption
- Level 3: Critical Supply Disruption.

These incident levels, with incident indicators (descriptors), are organised in the colour-coded Alert Warning System (AWS) and outlined below in section 4.2.4 of this Plan. They are used by the HMA to determine the incident level.

Application of this system and the Government/Market Coordination Guide (section 4.2.5) enable a consistent assessment of the severity of energy supply disruptions and ensure an appropriate and consistent level of response under the arrangements in this Plan.

Note: these incident levels differ to those under the State Emergency Management Plan.

Acute Supply Disruption vs Critical Supply Disruption

The material difference between an “Acute Supply Disruption” and a “Critical Supply Disruption” is the duration of the outage and the effectiveness of market strategies in mitigating its effects. A “Critical Supply Disruption” is declared at that point when the effects on the market or markets overwhelm existing control strategies and directly and materially affect the State Core Objectives (below). At this level, the emergency response is primarily focused on strategic consequence management.

State Core Objectives

To support the assessment of the severity of an incident using the AWS, the HMA will evaluate the impact (actual or probable) against the State Core Objectives.

The State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) has endorsed the following as the State Core Objectives:

- People: protect lives and wellbeing of persons
- Economy: maintain and grow the State’s productive capacity, employment and government revenue
- Social setting: ensure there is public order, under which people are housed and fed in a safe and sanitary manner and have access to social amenity including education and health services, and things of cultural importance are preserved
- Government: ensure there is, at all times, an effective and functioning system of government and societal respect for rule of law
- Infrastructure: maintain the functionality of infrastructure, particularly key transport infrastructure and utilities required for community health, economic production and effective management of emergencies
- Environment: protect the ecosystem and biodiversity of the state.

Overlap Between Incident Levels

There is always some overlap and interpretation for the indicators determining incident levels. The State Controller will recommend an incident level to the HMA based on the actual and/or potential impact of the incident. Satisfying one or more of the “indicators” does not automatically necessitate an escalation to that level. The “indicators” are provided for guidance but should be applied consistently.

4.2.4 Levels of Response – Alert Warning System (AWS)

The AWS details indicators for incident levels for electricity, gas and liquid fuels supply disruptions. In the event of more than one energy type disruption occurring simultaneously, the combined incident level will be the highest severity assessment of the concurrent disruptions.

Broad terms are used in defining levels of incidents, and definitions of some terms are in Appendix B: Glossary. The reason for this flexibility is to afford discretion to the State Controller and HMA where the indicators do not easily

fit within a perceived incident level risk profile.

Whilst the AWS incident levels are based on energy-specific criteria, Level 2 and Level 3 incidents will trigger equivalent-level State emergency management incident declarations.

The State Emergency Management Plan section 5.1.5 describes the criteria used to assess State emergency management incident levels, and the requirements following a declaration.

Actions undertaken for Level 2 and Level 3 incidents under the State Emergency Management Framework include, but are not limited to:

State Level 2 Incident

- The HMA will make an incident level declaration.
- Form a State Management Team
- Consider the formation of a State Support Group.
- Consider the formation of an Operational Area Support Group (OASG.)

State Level 3 Incident

- The HMA will make an incident level declaration.
- Contact all relevant emergency management agencies.
- Form a State Management Team.
- Form a State Support Group.
- Consider the formation of the Operational Area Support Group (OASG).

Table 3: Levels of Response – Alert Warning System

Level	Status	Gas Indicators	Liquid Fuel Indicators	Electricity Indicators
Level 0 White	Elevated Risk - Potential Acute Supply Disruption No discernible effect on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security of life and wellbeing Continuance of social integrity and necessary infrastructure Economy (State and/or region) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A natural hazard is threatening gas infrastructure. Planned, or unplanned maintenance, of a gas asset that will result in the reduction of available gas to the market for a number of days. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extraordinary circumstances within the supply chain which could lead to a market imbalance (local or State market). Unplanned maintenance of a fuel asset which results in an increased risk to the constant and timely supply of liquid fuel (primary and/or secondary grades) into the market. Increased public awareness and or media reporting on a perceived supply imbalance (both primary and/or secondary). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The supply system has entered a period of increased risk as a result of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> natural hazard events man-made risk system failure excessive demand days market failure. Intermittent power outages. An emergency response has been initiated.
Level 1 Yellow	High Risk for Acute Supply Disruption Minor effect on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security of life and wellbeing Continuance of social integrity and necessary infrastructure Economy (State and/or region) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An emergency response has been activated by a gas producer or gas infrastructure operator. Increased risk (perceived or actual) of a significant restriction in gas production or delivery of gas to customers. Minor restriction in gas production or delivery of gas to customer. No impact on essential users. Negligible impact on linepack. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A visible incident or situation affecting a critical piece of supply infrastructure. A moderate market imbalance affecting primary grade fuel(s). Supply channels moderately compromised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An incident/situation has impacted on the supply system. An emergency response has been initiated. Widespread, but manageable, power outages. Minor disruption to societal wellbeing. Unknown, complex or lengthy repairation. Large media interest. A Level 3 incident declaration has been made by another Hazard Management Agency.
Level 2 Amber	Actual or Imminent Acute Supply Disruption Noticeable effect on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security of life and well-being Continuance of social integrity and necessary infrastructure Economy (State and/or region) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An emergency response has been activated by a gas producer or infrastructure operator. Significant restriction in gas production or delivery of gas to customers. Limited curtailment of customers. Minimal short-term impact on linepack. Essential users remain adequately supplied. Heightened risk of a severe supply disruption. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Significant incident affecting a critical piece of supply infrastructure. A substantial market imbalance affecting primary grade fuel(s). Wide-spread stock-outs of secondary grade fuel(s). NOSEC triggers amber response. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Widespread (localised or linked) outage(s) affecting significant portion of the network. Localised outage(s) affecting: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key economic, telecommunications or social infrastructure, Critical health/government service assets. Anticipated short term duration of outage. High disruption to social wellbeing and routine. Existing emergency management response plans & mitigation strategies effective.
Level 3 Red	Critical Supply Disruption Significant effect on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security of life and wellbeing Continuance of social integrity and necessary infrastructure Economy (State and/or region) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An emergency response has been activated by a gas producer or infrastructure operator. Severe restriction in gas production or delivery of gas to customers. Significant curtailment of gas to customers. Actual or imminent threat of an emergency to a supply system. Actual or imminent threat to the supply of gas to essential services. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Catastrophic incident affecting a critical piece of supply infrastructure. A severe market imbalance affecting a primary fuel grade(s). Supply channels severely compromised. Actual or imminent threat to supply for essential services. NOSEC triggers red response. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anticipated long term duration. Extreme or actual threat to the health and safety of the community. Loss (potential or actual) of contingency power supply to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> hospitals and clinics correctional and policing facilities water and waste water facilities. Significant economic impact (either): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> local community/government State. Requirement of total coordination of resources, actions and emergency management agencies.

Notes: Please print this page on A3 to pass print accessibility standards.

4.2.5 Levels of Response – Government/Market Coordination Guide

The response to an energy supply disruption escalates with the increasing severity and duration of the incident.

Where possible, government intervention is avoided, with preference given to allowing established market arrangements and alternate resupply strategies to take effect. However, as these measures are overwhelmed, the more government involvement is required. The escalation of the response and likely actions undertaken are indicated below.

Table 4: Government/Market Coordination Guide

ESCALATION ↓	Level	Industry/Market	Hazard Management Agency/Government
	Level 0 White	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Industry incident response and business continuity arrangement (policies and plans). Market forces/mechanisms to manage supply and demand. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HMA to maintain situational awareness. No coordinated response between the HMA and market participants.
	Level 1 Yellow	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Industry incident response and business continuity arrangements (policies and plans). Market participants use internal redundancies and resupply strategies. Inter-organisational support policies. Market forces/mechanisms to manage supply and demand. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minor HMA coordination of information. Activation of the State Management Team (if required). Provision of advice to the Minister for Energy (if required).
	Level 2 Amber	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Industry incident response, crisis management and business continuity arrangements (policies and plans). Market participants use internal redundancies and resupply strategies. Inter-organisational support policies. Emergency related provisions under contracts, licenses or industry specific legislation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activation of the State Management Team. Consider the formation of the State Support Group. Major HMA coordination of information. Minor HMA coordination of resources. Provision of advice to the Minister for Energy. Implementation of State level 2 incident arrangements established under the State emergency management legislative and policy framework.
	Level 3 Red	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Industry incident response, crisis management and business continuity arrangements (policies and plans). Inter-organisational support policies. Emergency related provisions under contracts, licenses or industry specific legislation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activation of the State Management Team. Activation of the State Support Group. Full control of the situation by the HMA (excluding physical restoration of infrastructure). Significant coordination of information and resources. Declaration of an Emergency Situation or State of Emergency. Implementation of State level 3 incident arrangements established under the State emergency management legislative and policy framework. Development and/or exercise of emergency powers and emergency regulations.

Notes: Please print this page on A3 to pass print accessibility standards.

4.2.6 Competition and Consumer Act 2010

Incident response requires a coordinated approach by government and industry. This may include the gathering and use of commercially sensitive information that will be used to assist in shaping a combined response and may include directions to guarantee supply, or to restrict consumption (affecting industrial production).

The HMA response is in accordance with the provisions of the *Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Commonwealth)*.

4.2.7 Industry Emergency Response Arrangements

Each prudent energy infrastructure operator has its own incident management and business continuity arrangements. These arrangements are activated either in anticipation of an emergency, or in direct response. This State Hazard Plan seeks to complement these individual corporate arrangements, until an escalating response requires Directions to supplant them.

4.2.8 Market Mechanisms

Energy infrastructure operators, large users, market operators and market participants have various tools at their disposal to assist in the response to the incident. These can take the form of:

- market rules
- asset utilisation strategies
- demand restraint/supply curtailment
- supply system reconfiguration
- industry applicable legislation
- contractual mechanisms.

4.2.9 Business Continuity Plans

Businesses, essential service providers and government agencies follow established risk management principles. During supply outages, it is expected that most short-duration instances, business continuity and industry incident response plans will be sufficient to limit the more severe consequences of a disruption. As previously noted, government intervention is only expected when market mechanisms are overwhelmed.

4.2.10 Legislative Intervention

The HMA will recommend to government that legislative intervention is to be implemented as a last resort when:

- immediate urgent action needs to be taken under legislation to minimise harm to the State Core Objectives
- market strategies prove ineffective
- no further strategies are available to manage the disruption.

The HMA will recommend that legislative powers under are used to deliver a coordinated approach to the distribution of resources and the implementation of remedial strategies.

The HMA will determine the allocation of limited supplies of energy using the Priority Allocation Guidelines contained in Appendix F of this Plan.

Differing powers are available under the following four Acts for managing severe energy supply disruptions.

Gas Supply System Emergency: *Energy Coordination Act 1994*

The powers under the *Energy Coordination Act 1994* constitute the principal statutory mechanism to respond to severe (actual or potential) threats to a gas supply system. The powers, specific to the management of the supply system, enable both the system operator and the Minister for Energy to take measures to prevent a system failure before an emergency is declared.

Electricity System Emergency: *Energy Operators (Powers) Act 1979*

The powers under the *Energy Operators (Powers) Act 1979* constitute the principal statutory mechanism to respond to severe (actual or potential) threats to an electricity network. The powers, specific to the management of the supply system, enable both the energy operator and the Minister for Energy to take measures to prevent a system failure before an emergency is declared.

Declaration of a State of Emergency: *Fuel, Energy & Power Resources Act 1972*

The Governor of Western Australia may declare a State of Emergency and delegate responsibilities to the Minister for Energy.

Under the *Fuel, Energy & Power Resources Act 1972* (Part III section 47), the State is able to draft emergency regulations to manage all aspects of a disruption, including treatment of the consequences an emergency would have on the community. These regulations provide for the management of resources that best serve the needs of the community during the time of crisis.

This Act takes precedence⁴ over other State legislation and is very broad in scope. Emergency regulations are therefore suited to both controlling consumption of energy and managing the resulting effects, where there may be a requirement to control the supply of resources within the State.

Declaration of Emergency Situation or State of Emergency: *Emergency Management Act 2005*

To support the hazard specific legislation, additional emergency powers are available under the *Emergency Management Act 2005* to facilitate a whole of government response following the declaration of an emergency situation or state of emergency.

If required, the HMA or State Emergency Coordinator (as applicable) can declare an emergency situation to access the provisions under Part 6 of

Notes

⁴ *Fuel, Energy & Power Resources Act 1972* Part III section 41(1).

the *Emergency Management Act 2005*. The Minister for Emergency Services may declare a state of emergency if additional extraordinary measures are required.

4.2.11 Response Structure

The structures put in place will depend on the characteristics of the incident. For the majority of energy supply disruptions, the response will be managed at the whole-of-State level. This structure is shown in Figure 1: Expanding Response Structure. Where a disruption manifests in one or more discreet geographical locations, the HMA will move to set up individual operational areas. This structure and approach is shown in Figure 2.

Emergency Management Structure

The operator(s) of the affected energy infrastructure are the first responders to any energy supply disruption incident and remain the responsible organisation for reparation/restoration efforts. The HMA does not mandate the emergency management structure of infrastructure operators.

As illustrated in Figure 1, all incident responses start with the operators' emergency management team, or equivalent.

Hazard Management Structure

Where an incident escalates to require HMA notification and oversight, a hazard management structure will usually be activated.

A Level 1 (Yellow) response may require the establishment of an State Management Team, chaired by the Coordinator of Energy. If required, an State Support Group may be established during a Level 2 (Amber) response. The State Emergency Coordination Group (SECG) will likely be established during a Level 3 (Red) response.

For incidents that reach sufficient severity, the State Disaster Council (SDC) may be utilised as the peak response body.




Figure 1 Expanding Response Structure

Figure 1: Expanding Response Structure

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Additional actions likely to be undertaken by the HMA or Government at each level of escalation are indicated in Table 4: Government/Market Coordination Guide.

The specific effects and response required for each incident will determine the response structure/system used in responding to that incident. Supply disruptions with regional rather than statewide areas of effect will require bespoke regional responses.

State Controller

The State Controller is responsible for the overall management, provision of strategic direction, and operational coordination of agencies during an emergency. As required, the HMA or their delegate will perform the role of State Controller.

In the discharge of their duties, the State Controller (if not the HMA) will liaise closely with the Coordinator of Energy to ensure all strategies meet both the HMA responsibilities and the expectations of government.

State Management Team

The State Management Team provides the operational response to an incident. The team consists of Energy Policy WA staff and industry representatives with the potential to form several multi-person units listed below to provide expertise and functionality to the HMA. Team meetings will usually be chaired by the Coordinator of Energy, as HMA.

- **Operations Unit** – Operations provides administrative and technical support to the response.
- **Intelligence Unit** – Intelligence gathers and disseminates accurate operational information to allow sound decision making during the response.
- **Planning Unit** – Planning is the principal group responsible for developing and implementing strategies to combat an energy supply disruption. It will consist of industry and government representatives.

- **Public Information Unit** – Public Information works to develop, implement and monitor an integrated public information campaign.
- **Logistics Unit** – Logistics provides general resource support for the response teams while ensuring compliance with relevant legislation and government policies.

State Support Group

When established, the State Support Group supports the work of the State Management Team by providing Liaison Officers that can provide agency-specific information, expert advice and support in relation to strategic and operational management of an incident.

The group has a specific focus on the impact to the community, essential services and the economy.

The State Support Group consists of representatives from government agencies and the community. It serves the dual purpose of providing strategic support to the emergency response and facilitating reporting on the impacts of an energy shortage for consideration in the response strategy.

State Emergency Coordination Group (SECG) and State Disaster Council

Within the State Emergency Management Framework, the SECG and State Disaster Council will be established if the Minister of Emergency Services declares a State of Emergency. A SECG must be considered if a Level 3 incident occurs or has potential to occur.

Further detail is available at the [SEMC Website](#).

4.2.12 Regional Responses

Energy supply disruptions can have widespread effects in the community, especially regional areas remote from alternative service providers.

The HMA will maintain the whole-of-State structure outlined in the previous section but may move to establish one or more operational areas based on the locations affected.

The structures and approach are outlined in Figure 2: Regional Response Structure.




Figure 2: Regional Response Structure

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Operational Area Support Group (OASG)

The HMA will establish an Operational Area Manager (OAM) and Operational Area Support Group (OASG) in each operational area, however it will retain a single whole-of-State Management Team that each OAM will report to. This allows the utilization of established emergency management structures for multiple operational areas, whilst continuing to reflect the nature of energy supply disruptions where incident response “on the ground” rests primarily with the affected asset operator.

In the event that these roles and groups are already established by another HMA for a different hazard (for example, a severe weather event that leads to an energy supply disruption) the HMAs will liaise and determine the best approach to resourcing the required roles.

The OAM will chair the meetings of the OASG and is responsible for communicating with the State Controller and HMA to ensure the State level strategy is being implemented and that the operational needs of emergency responders, combat and support agencies are being met.

District Emergency Coordinators and Local Emergency Coordinators will exist for each Operational Area and will provide a line of communication to the SECG.

4.3 Public Information and Media Management

Provision of information to the public is a critical element in the response to an energy supply disruption. It enables the community to assess their vulnerabilities, be informed and remain in touch with the response.

Good media management is a tool to support HMA strategies in combating the social flow-on effects of a supply disruption. Mass media and social media capability may themselves be affected by energy supply disruption.

4.3.1 Media Management Strategy

Where possible, the HMA considers that affected industry participants are the most appropriate body for the release of information specific to their business.

Energy suppliers and operators have dedicated media liaison teams and customer service representatives. The public is encouraged to contact their retailer, supplier or network provider, in the first instance, when concerned with supply of a particular energy type. 24-hour emergency phone numbers are provided on most of their websites.

The development of communication strategies by the HMA will take into account distribution of information to consumers in vulnerable groups. Public information provision will be coordinated through the HMA's Public Information Team.

Where an incident has exceeded the capabilities of individual organisations, the HMA will lead the release of public information utilising the resources under the State Emergency Management Framework, up to and including the State Emergency Public Information Coordinator (SEPIC). The escalation of the public information function is outlined in the table below.

Table 5: Escalation of the public information strategy

Level	Escalating Public Information Strategy
Level 0 White	Public information and requests for information are directed to, and handled by, the affected market participants.
Level 1 Yellow	HMA coordination and oversight of consistent messaging, however, public information and requests for information are directed to, and handled by, the affected market participants.
Level 2 Amber	Public information and requests for information are coordinated by the HMA and affected market participants. A lead agency will be determined to act as the central communication point for the response.
Level 3 Red	Public information and requests for information are directed solely to the HMA. The HMA, in concert with the Incident Management Team and energy industry, will develop a coordinated statement. All media/emergency public information resources available to the HMA will be utilised.

4.3.2 Release Methods

The development of any Emergency Public Information will take into consideration any loss of broadcast and/or web media capability when developing an information strategy. Loss of electricity may mean common communication platforms (mobile telephone, internet, radio and television) are degraded or unavailable. Should this occur, the HMA will utilise any available alternate platforms such as Regional AM radio or will arrange for government and energy industry representatives to attend affected areas.

4.3.3 Emergency Public Information

In the event the incident escalates beyond the resources of the HMA to adequately undertake the public information function, or where assistance is required, the SEPIC (in consultation with the State Emergency Coordinator and the HMA) can activate the State Support Plan - Emergency Public Information when there is a need for a whole of government emergency public information arrangements.

4.3.4 Public Warnings/Information

Notifications to the market of an incident affecting the supply of energy are the direct responsibility of the affected operator.

Western Power and Horizon Power⁵ maintain a real time fault identification and restoration system. When incidents are escalated internally, both organisations will release information to the market via a number of platforms.

If the internet remains available, live information on forecast/actual supply and demand for gas and electricity can also be accessed via the Australian Energy Market Operator's (AEMO) website at www.aemo.com.au.

In the event of a severe gas supply disruption, the HMA will activate the Emergency Management Facility of the AEMO's Gas Bulletin Board. This

Notes

⁵ There are expected delays for some remote communities.

activation will be noted in the website's banner found at gbbwa.aemo.com.au.

For liquid fuels, the FuelWatch website (fuelwatch.wa.gov.au) maintains up to date information on petrol pricing. Individual fuel suppliers also provide public media releases via their own websites in the event of most serious supply issues.

4.4 Evacuation Arrangements

Severe energy supply outages (mostly relating to electricity) occurring in densely populated areas, such as Perth's Central Business District, may necessitate the need for the orderly dispersal of large numbers of people. In considering the need for an evacuation, the HMA will consult with the Western Australia Police Force, Main Roads Western Australia, Department of Communities and the applicable local government authorities.

4.4.1 Remote Communities

The HMA considers that the AWS adequately captures the circumstances in relation to energy supply disruptions in remote communities. However, in assessing the explicit impact on the State Core Objectives, the HMA will be mindful of the intrinsic risk faced by remote communities and the local service levels afforded.

The HMA will work with remote service providers, network operators and other energy suppliers to facilitate return of supply.

Conventional outages and essential service disruptions do not automatically constitute an emergency or require a response by the HMA.

4.5 Funding Arrangements for Emergency Response

Generally, to ensure accountability for expenditure incurred, the HMA or Controlling Agency directing an emergency management agency or other agencies or organisations supporting the emergency response, is responsible for payment of costs associated with those activities required during an immediate emergency response. This is in compliance with State EM Policy 5.12 and State EM Plan section 5.4.

Where costs are incurred in delivering services or resources at the request of the HMA which are not part of that agency's core function and there are no prior agreements as to funding responsibilities, such costs will be met by the HMA.

Where resources and external assistance need to be acquired by an organisation, authorisation from the Incident Controller will be obtained prior to incurring expenditure. Where the role of Controlling Agency has been handed over to another agency, authorisation should be obtained from the HMA prior to incurring significant expenditure.

Financial arrangements under this plan and the State Emergency Management Policy do not extend to any commercial loss or damage caused by decisions or directions made by the HMA or Minister for Energy during an incident.

Refer to State Emergency Management Policy section 5.12 for further information.

4.6 Stand Down and Debriefs

Incident response personnel are stood down by the State Controller or respective OAM. This will occur when the impacts of the energy supply disruption have been largely addressed through a range of mitigation measures, or when the members of the response teams can take no further

action to provide support to Government or industry.

In compliance with State Emergency Management Policy statement 5.11.1, the HMA will prepare a post-operation report for any incident that involves the establishment of a SECG for submission to the SEMC.

The recommendations emerging from a review will be used to revise this Plan and its related documents as part of the HMA's commitment to building capacity and continual improvement in protecting the State from the effects of disruptions to energy supply.

A dark, blue-toned photograph of a rocky canyon. A waterfall is visible in the background, cascading over a rock face. The foreground shows the rugged, layered rock walls of the canyon. The overall mood is somber and contemplative.

Part Five:

Recovery

Recovery is the coordinated process of supporting disruption affected communities in the reconstruction and restoration of physical infrastructure, the environment and community, and restoring psychosocial and economic well-being. The HMA must begin recovery processes in parallel with the response to an emergency to allow a seamless transition to recovery-only actions.

Under the *Emergency Management Act 2005* it is a function of local government to manage recovery following an emergency affecting the community in its district.

The extent of recovery activities will depend on the nature and magnitude of the emergency. In some circumstances, it may be necessary for the State government to assume responsibility for coordinating the recovery process at a whole-of-government level. This will be the case where a large area of the State is impacted by a disruption for an extended period.

The HMA will facilitate the transition to recovery as noted under section 6 of the State Emergency Management Policy and section 6 of the State Emergency Management Plan. This will include providing an understanding of known or emerging impacts to the Local and State Recovery Coordinators during the response and arranging for all relevant organisations and agencies to provide input into an Impact Statement.

As referenced in section 4.1 and 4.2.11 of this plan, the operator(s) of the affected energy infrastructure are responsible for their own reparation and restoration efforts. Additional restoration activities may be required during the recovery phase of an incident should the need to repair and/or replace infrastructure be required for post incident infrastructure stability.

Industry stakeholders may be required to undertake certain actions during the recovery phase. This may include finalising the restoration of damaged assets, attending recovery committees and forums, and providing expert advice to the HMA or other Government agencies.

A dark blue, monochromatic photograph of a rocky canyon. The rock walls are layered and textured, with a small waterfall visible in the background. The word "Appendices" is written in white, bold, sans-serif font, centered horizontally and partially underlined by a white horizontal line.

Appendices

Appendix A: Distribution List

This State Hazard Plan for Energy Supply Disruption is available on the [SEMC website](#). The agencies below will be notified when an updated version is published on this website:

The HMA will advise:

- All agencies and organisations with responsibilities under this Plan
- Minister for Energy

The SEMC Business Unit will advise:

- National Emergency Management Australia
- Minister for Emergency Services
- State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC), SEMC subcommittee and reference group members
- State Library of Western Australia.

Appendix B: Glossary of Terms/Acronyms

Terminology used throughout this document has the meaning prescribed in section 3 of the *Emergency Management Act 2005* or as defined in the State Emergency Management Glossary. In addition, the following hazard-specific definitions apply.

B1: Glossary of Terms

Term	Definition
Acute Supply Disruption	Either widespread or localised, however the areas affected contain key State infrastructure assets or are locations of important economic activity. The length of time is not expected to be of significant length and existing mitigation strategies are in the main sufficient to meet the short-term operational risk.
Alert Warning System (AWS)	A colour-coded system that facilitates a consistent approach in assessing and classifying the severity of energy supply disruption events to enable an appropriate level of readiness and response.
Allocations	For the purposes of this Plan, 'allocations' refers to a percentage of allotted contracted energy, that may or may not meet required demand, because of a tightening in supply.
Consequence Management	Ensuring that the outcome of an event or situation, expressed qualitatively or quantitatively, does not adversely affect the community.
Coordinator of Energy	The Coordinator of Energy is the statutory role of the Executive Director of Energy Policy WA.
Critical Supply Disruption	Mitigation strategies are insufficient, and the State is either experiencing or about to experience a significant degradation to the infrastructure/services that preserve the Core State Objectives.
Curtailment	For the purposes of this Plan, 'curtailment' is the partial or complete reduction of supply or draw of electricity, liquid fuel or gas, from a producer, infrastructure operator or large user, either in a voluntary or mandatory manner.

Term	Definition
Emergency Management Facility (EMF)	An online information service facilitating the sharing of gas market information to assist in the management of a gas supply disruption, only available to be viewed by users specified by the Coordinator of Energy. Sits within the Gas Bulletin Board administered by the Australian Energy Market Operator.
Emergency Management Team (EMT)	Industry or Government Trading Enterprises will be undertaking the physical response where energy infrastructure damage or failure is the catalyst for the disruption. The most common term for these teams is EMT. However, terminology may vary between organisations. Fills the same role as an Incident Management Team in the AIIMS structure.
Emergency Services Response	Refers to any activities undertaken by emergency services that result from the energy supply disruption. This recognises that, whilst the HMA is ultimately responsible for all response activities, it would be inappropriate for it to attempt to direct the activities of WA Police, DFES or WA Health where it has little or no expertise.
Energy Policy WA Operations Plan	<p>The Energy Policy WA Operations Plan deals mainly with the response phase of emergency management. It discusses how the objectives of the State Hazard Plan – Energy Supply Disruption will be achieved.</p> <p>The Energy Policy WA Operations Plan is designed to be modular. It consists of compulsory sections that contain information of relevance to all stakeholders, sections that are specific to groups of stakeholders, and a series of optional sections that provide further background information.</p>
Essential User / Essential Service	Departments, organisations and institutions (government and private) deemed necessary for the continued operation of a functioning society.
Hazard Management Agency	References to the Hazard Management Agency are references to the Coordinator of Energy and by association the Energy Policy WA.
Heightened Risk	A fundamental increase in risk to the energy supply chain, not, or only partially, offset by implemented mitigation strategies.

Term	Definition
High Risk	The energy supply chain has entered a period of increased risk whereby additional strain placed upon the system may result in an acute supply disruption.
Liquid Fuels	Liquid petroleum, a liquid petroleum product, a liquid petrochemical, methanol or ethanol (<i>Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984</i> [Commonwealth] section 3).
Market Participants	For the purposes of this Plan, it refers to all producers, distributors and consumers of energy excluding small use customers.
Minor Effect	The effect is sufficient for the implementation of emergency plans and uptake of established mitigation strategies. In the main, all strategies are offsetting the increase in operational risk.
National Oil Supplies Emergency Committee	The main executive channel through which Australian governments, in cooperation with industry, formulate the overall management response to a widespread fuel shortage. NOSEC reports to the Energy and Climate Change Ministerial Council and comprises officials from the Australian Government, the State and Territory governments and the oil industry.
No Discernible Effect	The effect is not sufficient to cause undue stress on the operations of the State and the community.
Notifiable Incident	An incident that meets the set of parameters established by the HMA on what constitutes an incident of 'heightened risk' or above. Outlined in Table 2 of this Plan.
Primary Fuel Types	For the purposes of the Alert Warning System, comprises of the following transport fuels: ULP (91), Diesel, Aviation Fuels (AvGas and Jet A1) and marine bunker fuel. Classification is based upon their level of consumption and impact on the community in the event of a shortage.
Priority Allocation Guidelines	Provides guidelines on the allocation of a limited supply of energy to priority uses during energy supply disruptions. Provided in Appendix F of this Plan.

Term	Definition
Secondary Fuel Types	For the purposes of the Alert Warning System, comprises of the following transport fuels: PULP (95), 98 RON, B20, E10, P100 and Liquid Petroleum Gas. Classified based upon their level of consumption and impact on the community in the event of a shortage.
State-Owned Electricity Corporations	Horizon Power (regional generator, transmission/distribution network operator and retailer). Synergy (generator and retailer in the South West Interconnected System). Western Power (transmission/distribution network operator of the South West Interconnected Network).
Supply System (Electricity)	In relation to electricity supply, takes it meaning from the <i>Energy Operators (Powers) Act 1979</i> : the generating works, distribution works, and service apparatus involved in the supply of electricity.
Supply System (Gas)	In relation to gas supply, takes it meaning from the <i>Energy Coordination Act 1994</i> (section 24A and Schedule 3), which refers to any distribution system operated within the State and the privatised Dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline.

B2: Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AEMO	Australian Energy Market Operator
AWS	Alert Warning System
DEMIRS	Department of Energy, Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety
EMF	Emergency Management Facility
EMT	Emergency Management Team
HMA	Hazard Management Agency
IMT	Incident Management Team
NOSEC	National Oil Supplies Emergency Committee
OAM	Operational Area Manager
OASG	Operational Area Support Group
SECG	State Emergency Coordination Group
SEMC	State Emergency Management Committee
SEPIC	State Emergency Public Information Coordinator

Appendix C : Overview of Emergency Management Roles and Responsibilities for Energy Supply Disruption

This appendix reflects the collaborative and whole of market approach to managing energy supply disruptions. Government and non-government organisations listed below are either directly or indirectly involved in emergency management through requirements under various legislation, or voluntary arrangements with Energy Policy WA. Where preparedness and response activities are indicated, this reflects that organisation’s ongoing commitment to assist the Coordinator of Energy as the Hazard Management Agency (HMA) in undertaking the functions under this Plan.

Note: In relation to references to “Essential Services” in an energy supply role, “Essential Services” are established in the Priority Allocation Guidelines in Appendix F of this Plan.

C1: Emergency Management Roles for Energy Supply Disruption

Organisation	Role(s)	Prevention	Preparedness	Response	Recovery
Alcoa	Gas Market Participant		✓	✓	
Alinta Energy	Generator / Gas Market Participant / Retailer	✓	✓	✓	
Australian Maritime Safety Authority	Commonwealth Authority	✓			
APA Group	Infrastructure Operator	✓	✓	✓	
ATCO Gas Australia	Infrastructure Operator	✓	✓	✓	
The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO)	Electricity System Operator / Market Administrator		✓	✓	
Australian Gas Infrastructure Group	Infrastructure Operator	✓	✓	✓	

Organisation	Role(s)	Prevention	Preparedness	Response	Recovery
BHP Billiton	Generator / Network Operator / Retailer / Gas Producer / Large User	✓	✓	✓	
BP Australia	Liquid Fuel Supplier / Gas Market Participant	✓	✓	✓	
Caltex Australia	Liquid Fuel Supplier	✓	✓	✓	
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Western Australia	Industry Stakeholder		✓	✓	
Chamber of Minerals and Energy Western Australia	Industry Advocacy Body		✓	✓	
Chevron Australia	Gas Producer	✓	✓	✓	
Coogee Chemicals	Liquid Fuel Supplier	✓	✓	✓	
Coordinator of Energy (Energy Policy WA)	Hazard Management Agency (HMA) for Energy Supply Disruptions (Government Agency)	✓	✓	✓	✓ Transition
Department of Communities	Government Agency		✓	✓	✓
Department of Education	Government Agency			✓	
Department of Fire and Emergency Services	Government Agency / Essential Service / HMA for (non-energy supply) prescribed hazard(s)	✓	✓	✓	✓

Organisation	Role(s)	Prevention	Preparedness	Response	Recovery
Department of Health	Government Agency / Essential Service / HMA for (non-energy supply) prescribed hazard(s)		✓	✓	
Department of Energy, Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety	Government Agency / Regulator	✓	✓	✓	
Department of the Premier and Cabinet	Government Agency			✓	✓
Department of Transport	Government Agency / HMA for (non-energy supply) prescribed hazard(s)		✓	✓	
Economic Regulation Authority	Regulator	✓			
Horizon Power	Generator / Network & System Operator / Retailer / Gas Market Participant	✓	✓	✓	✓
Local Government / Authorities / Shire	Local Government			✓	✓
Main Roads WA	Essential Service			✓	✓
Motor Trade Association of WA	Industry Stakeholder		✓	✓	
National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority	Commonwealth Authority	✓			
National Oil Supplies Emergency Committee	Commonwealth Authority		✓	✓	

Organisation	Role(s)	Prevention	Preparedness	Response	Recovery
North West Shelf Gas	Gas Market Participant		✓	✓	
North West Shelf Office of Lifting Coordinator	Gas Market Participant		✓	✓	
Pilbara Independent System Operator (Pilbara ISOCo)	Electricity System Operator	✓	✓	✓	
Port Authorities	Industry Stakeholder	✓			
Public Transport Authority	Government Agency / HMA for (non-energy supply) prescribed hazard(s) / Essential Service		✓	✓	✓
PUMA Energy	Liquid Fuel Supplier	✓	✓	✓	
Quadrant Energy	Gas Producer	✓	✓	✓	
Rio Tinto	Generator / Network Operator / Retailer	✓	✓	✓	✓
Royal Automobile Club WA	Industry Stakeholder		✓	✓	
Santos	Gas Producer	✓	✓	✓	
Synergy	Gas Market Participant / Electricity Generator and Retailer	✓	✓	✓	

Organisation	Role(s)	Prevention	Preparedness	Response	Recovery
Viva Energy Australia	Liquid Fuel Supplier	✓	✓	✓	
Water Corporation (or other Water Service Providers where applicable)	Essential Service		✓	✓	✓
Western Australia Police Force	Government Agency / Essential Service / HMA for (non-energy supply) prescribed hazard(s) / State Emergency Coordinator		✓	✓	✓
Western Power	Network Operator	✓	✓	✓	✓
Woodside Energy	Gas Producer	✓	✓	✓	
Yara Fertiliser	Gas market participant		✓	✓	

All industry organisations and government agencies listed above should all meet the requirements of being ready to respond to an energy supply disruption.

C2: Summary of Emergency Management Responsibilities

The summary of duties below are examples of activities that are expected from all Industry organisations and Government Agencies with roles under this plan. This list is not exhaustive and further responsibilities may be conferred by the Energy Hazards Operations Plan or by the HMA during an incident.

Phase	Industry	Government Agency
Prevention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Contribute to prevention through adherence to relevant legislation and good industry practice. b. Prevent and minimise the risk of injury, death or damage to property or the environment. c. Prevent and minimise the disruption to essential network services. d. Assist in the prevention or reduction of the severity and impact of the hazard. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. In cooperation with other agencies, provide communities with risk awareness, information, and education. b. Maintain an awareness of the readiness of emergency service infrastructure including assessment of impact on critical response requirements in an Energy Supply Disruption. c. Prepare the emergency services response during an energy supply disruption for when a prescribed hazard, for which the Fire and Emergency Services Commissioner is responsible, was the cause of an energy supply disruption. d. Consider prevention and mitigation matters where appropriate in relation to activities and premises regulated under the relevant Acts.
Preparedness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Maintain individual crisis and emergency response plans, which include planning for the provision of mutual assistance and maintaining up-to-date contact information for key personnel (and links between companies to ensure uniform public statement in any emergency). b. Participate in exercises in an open and constructive manner. c. Prepare for threats to, actual or imminent, the security of the electricity supply system. d. Assist the HMA in developing the State plans and strategies for managing gas and electricity supply disruptions to protect and ensure the resilience of essential services. e. Participate in exercises in an open and constructive manner. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Provide representatives to various Local, District and State Emergency Management Committees and Coordination Groups as required. b. Identify and provide advice and support appropriate to the agencies area of expertise. c. Provide and maintain appropriate and adequate agency capabilities commensurate with the risk levels for the relevant hazards. d. Prepare the emergency services response during an energy supply disruption for when a prescribed hazard, for which the relevant HMA is responsible, was the cause of an energy supply disruption.

Phase	Industry	Government Agency
Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Notify the HMA of an incident involving an energy asset. b. Advise the HMA of the existence or likelihood of a potential fuel supply disruption. c. Provide a representative to the State Management Team, if required. d. Notify of threats to, actual or imminent, the security of the electricity supply system. e. Provide technical advice on network configuration. f. Respond to any incident based on good industry practice and approved safety cases. g. Cooperate to provide mutual assistance requested to any affected party in an emergency with the focus on safety, the environment and the provision of essential services. h. Provide an effective response to an emergency when support is requested, taking account of the available assistance in the recovery of an essential network service affected by such an emergency. i. Provide expert advice and assist in the development and implementation of strategies to manage a gas and electricity supply disruption. j. Participate in the incident debrief process. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Provide a representative to the State Support Group or OASG, if required. b. In consultation with the HMA (Coordinator of Energy), and consideration of available resources, coordinate the emergency services response during an energy supply disruption, including the activation of relevant State Hazard Plans if required. c. When directed, discharge the duties of the HMA for energy supply disruptions on behalf of the Coordinator of Energy, as listed in the State Emergency Management Plan. d. In cooperation with other agencies and organisations, provide communities with energy supply disruption awareness, information and education. e. In cooperation with other agencies and organisations circulate public messaging around energy supply disruption and promote personal safety community advice during an emergency supply disruption incident. f. Provide expert advice and assist in the development and implementation of strategies to manage a gas and electricity supply disruption. g. Participate in the incident debrief process. h. See Appendix D for Government agency specific response responsibilities.

Phase	Industry	Government Agency
Recovery	<div>a. Restore electricity services in the priority requested by the HMA or the designated recovery authority.</div> <div>b. Assist in the provision of emergency power as requested by the HMA or the designated recovery authority.</div> <div>c. Develop and maintain plans to protect and ensure the resilience of essential services.</div> <div>d. Coordinate and monitor long-term clean up, when required.</div>	<div>a. Restore essential services in the priority requested by the HMA or the designated recovery authority.</div> <div>b. Assist in the provision of emergency services as requested by the HMA or the designated recovery authority.</div> <div>c. Develop and maintain plans to protect and ensure the resilience of essential services.</div> <div>d. Coordinate and monitor long-term clean up, when required.</div>

Appendix D: Roles and Responsibilities in Response Plans

In addition to the summary of responsibilities listed in Appendix C, this appendix outlines the specific response roles and/or responsibilities of agencies and organisations under this Plan. General all-hazards information on roles and responsibilities can be found in Appendix E of the State Emergency Management Plan.

Organisation	Response Responsibilities
The Australian Energy Market Operator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Notify of threats to, actual or imminent, the security of the electricity supply system. b. Provide technical advice on network configuration. c. Provide advice on changing and emerging risk profiles to the network. d. Activate the Emergency Management Facility of the Gas Bulletin Board, if an Emergency Management Facility (EMF) Direction has been issued by the Coordinator of Energy. e. Provide a representative to the State Management Team, if required.
Department of Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Provision of emergency relief and support services for those affected by the incident, including operating evacuation centres and providing crisis support services (emergency accommodation, emergency food, emergency clothing and personal requisites, personal support services, financial assistance) as required. b. Facilitate registration and reunification, including arranging for Register.Find.Reunite to be activated via the Australian Red Cross, as required. c. Identify and provide advice and support to the existing Department of Communities' at-risk population client base. d. In consultation with the HMA (Coordinator of Energy), and consideration of available resources, determine the number and location of evacuation centres to be opened during an energy supply disruption emergency. e. Provide a representative to the State Support Group or OASG, if required.
Department of Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Provide advice on the affected operations of the education sector. b. Provide a representative to the State Support Group or OASG, if required.

Organisation	Response Responsibilities
Department of Fire and Emergency Services (DFES)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Manage the relevant emergency services response during an energy supply disruption, including the activation of relevant State Hazard Plans if required. This is in situations when an energy supply disruption incident has resulted in DFES responding to incidents within its statutory responsibilities or that a prescribed hazard for which the Fire and Emergency Services Commissioner is responsible (under the emergency management legislation) was the cause of an energy supply disruption. Many hazards that the Fire and Emergency Services Commissioner is responsible for could potentially result in a disruption, including bushfires, cyclones, HAZMAT, floods and tsunamis. b. Assist in communicating messages to the public. c. During an energy supply disruption emergency, protect the community, in accordance with its governing legislation. d. Provide a representative to the State Support Group or OASG, if required.
Department of Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Manage the health response during an energy supply disruption, including the activation of the State Health Emergency Response Plan, if required. b. Advise Energy Policy WA on all medical and health aspects in relation to an energy supply disruption incident. c. Maintain an awareness of the readiness of health service infrastructure including assessment of impact on clinical services, response and/or evacuation requirements. d. Provide health advice and support to the designated recovery committee. e. Provide a representative to the State Support Group or OASG, if required.
Department of Energy, Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety (DEMIRS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Assist in specific technical strategies that fall within the remit of DEMIRS. b. Provide a representative to the State Management Team, if required.
Department of Water and Environmental Regulation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Provide advice on environmental and air quality issues. b. Assist with implementation of measures relating to the relaxation of fuel standards. a. Provide a representative to the State Support Group or OASG, if required.

Organisation	Response Responsibilities
Energy Policy WA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. When directed, discharge the duties of the HMA for energy supply disruptions on behalf of the Coordinator of Energy, as listed in the State Emergency Management Plan. b. Manage the activation of the response section of this Plan and other relevant plans. c. Convene an State Support Group or OASG, as required. d. Request activation of a SECG, if required. e. Issue EMF Directions, if required. f. In cooperation with other agencies and organisations, provide communities with energy supply disruption awareness, information and education. g. Circulate public messaging around energy supply disruption and promote personal safety community advice during an emergency supply disruption emergency. h. Support the Commonwealth's strategy in response to a National liquid fuel emergency.
Local governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Participate in community awareness programs on energy supply disruption risks. b. Assist in communicating messages to the public during an energy supply disruption emergency. c. Provide resources to assist Energy Policy WA if requested. d. In consultation with the Department of Communities, identify venues that may be used as evacuation centres. e. Close and open roads within their jurisdiction, when requested by Energy Policy WA. f. Provide details on road condition to Energy Policy WA. g. Undertake recovery activities, as required (noting transition to recovery will be implemented by the HMA during the response phase). h. Assist in the identification and support of at-risk communities. i. Provide a representative to the State Support Group or OASG, if required.

Organisation	Response Responsibilities
Main Roads WA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Provide advice to Energy Policy WA on the impact of energy supply disruption on the State road network. b. Close and open State roads when requested by Energy Policy WA. This Plan recognises that the Commissioner of Main Roads (or delegated Officers) has the power to close or open roads under the <i>Main Roads Act 1930</i>. c. Assist in the development of a transport strategy. d. Provide a representative to the State Support Group or OASG, if required.
Other HMAs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Manage the response to any other legislated hazard that occurs concurrently with an energy supply disruption, including activation of the relevant State Hazard Plan.
Pilbara Independent System Operator (Pilbara ISOCO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Notify of threats to, actual or imminent, the security of the electricity supply system. b. Provide advice on changing and emerging risk profiles to the network. c. Provide technical advice on network configuration. d. Provide a representative to the State Management Team, if required.
Public Transport Authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Provide advice on the potential and actual impacts of an energy supply disruption on the public transport system. b. Close and open transport services when requested by Energy Policy WA. c. Communicate service closures to the public. d. Assist in the development of a public transport strategy. e. Provide a representative to the State Support Group or OASG, if required.

Organisation	Response Responsibilities
Synergy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Provide advice on the impacts of an energy supply disruption on at-risk communities. b. Provide advice on changing and emerging risk profiles to the network. This may be a delegate under the Pilbara Network Rules. c. Assist in communicating messages to the public. d. Provide a representative to the State Management Team, if required.
Water Corporation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Responsibilities as outlined in State Emergency Management Plan – Appendix E. b. Provide advice to Energy Policy WA in respect to water and wastewater services to Water Corporation customers. c. Provide a representative to the State Support Group or OASG, if required.
Western Australia Police Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Manage the relevant emergency services response during an energy supply disruption, including the activation of relevant State Hazard Plans if required. This is in situations when a prescribed hazard for which the Commissioner of Police is responsible (under the emergency management legislation) was the cause of an energy supply disruption. Some hazards that the Commissioner of Police is responsible for could potentially result in an energy supply disruption, including air crash, road crash, space re-entry debris or terrorist act. b. Provide advice on the impacts of an energy supply disruption on operations and community. c. Assist and support in the development of traffic and security management plans. d. In the event of mass casualties, provide Disaster Victim Identification. e. Provide a representative to the State Support Group or OASG, if required.

Organisation	Response Responsibilities
Western Power & Horizon Power	<ul style="list-style-type: none">a. Provide advice on the impacts of an energy supply disruption on at-risk communities.b. Assist in communicating messages to the public.c. Provide technical advice in relation to energy supply, disconnection and restoration.d. Provide advice on changing and emerging risk profiles to the network.e. Assist in the provision of emergency energy as requested by Energy Policy WA or the designated recovery authority.f. Provide resources to assist Energy Policy WA when requested.g. Assist in the development of re-energisation and network reconfiguration strategies.h. Assist in communicating messages to the public during an energy supply disruption emergency, in accordance with the media Management Strategy outlined in section 4.3 of this Plan.i. Provide a representative to the State Management Team, if required.

Appendix E: National Liquid Fuel Emergency

The Commonwealth Government, through the National Oil Supplies Emergency Committee (NOSEC), monitors the status of fuel supply in all States and Territories across Australia.

The Commonwealth Minister for the Environment and Energy will provide advice to the Governor-General as to the need to declare a 'National Liquid Fuel Emergency' under the *Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984* (Commonwealth) after consultation with NOSEC (including industry and jurisdictions). Such a declaration may be made due to a severe disruption incident affecting a single State/Territory, multiple States/Territories or the country as a whole.

The Hazard Management Agency will keep NOSEC apprised of the situation in Western Australia in the event of a supply disruption and may request that the declaration of a National Liquid Fuel Emergency be considered.

In the event of a National Liquid Fuel Emergency, NOSEC will implement the Commonwealth National Liquid Fuel Emergency Response Plan (NLFERP). The Commonwealth Minister may direct individual States and Territories to manage the response in their jurisdiction using existing arrangements. In this case, the approach outlined in this Plan will continue, but with additional oversight from NOSEC.

Alternatively, NOSEC, at the direction of the Minister, may implement a unified strategy for all jurisdictions affected. The NLFERP and Commonwealth legislation overrides any arrangements previously implemented by the State. This includes demand curtailment strategies and priority. This Plan is aligned with the NLFERP in order to ensure an easy transition between State and Commonwealth arrangements.

Essential Users under the *Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984* (Commonwealth)

In the event of a declared National Liquid Fuel Emergency, the following activities as prescribed in section 11 of the *Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984* (Commonwealth) will take priority over the Western Australian government's identified priority users:

- Australia's defence
- the provision of the particular product as fuel for ships and aircraft engaged in international or domestic trade or commerce
- the export of the particular product from Australia
- activities essential for the health, safety and welfare of the community as listed in the *Liquid Fuel Emergency (Activities – Essential users) Determination 2008* (Commonwealth) (the Determination).

Those activities listed in the Determination include:

- an ambulance service
- a corrective service
- a fire or rescue service
- a police service
- a public transport service
- a State Emergency Service or an equivalent organisation
- a taxi service.

Further information on NOSEC and the NLFERP are available at the Department of Climate Change, Energy, Environment and Water website www.energy.gov.au.

Appendix F: Priority Allocation Guidelines

The following guidelines present an order of allocation that may be used by the HMA when distributing a limited amount of energy to the community. The allocation strategy will also be informed by an assessment of the impact of each individual incident on the State Core Objectives, which will also assist with prioritisation of individual services under each priority level.

General Order of Priority

Priority	Service	Including (but not limited to and in no particular order)
1	Energy Infrastructure	Gas, fuel and electricity production generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure.
2	Essential Services	Production, supply and distribution of water supplies. Health services as determined by the State Health Coordinator. Waste and wastewater management. Maintenance of communication networks. Maintenance of emergency service provision. Maintenance of law and order by police services, the judicial system and the correctional system.
3	Industry Providing Essential Goods and Services	Production, supply and distribution of basic food supplies. Child protection, children in care and community well-being. Maintenance of mortuary services (identification, certification, religious practices, storage, burials and cremations). Public transport services including taxi services. Maintenance of banking and financial services. Continuity of critical government functions.
4	Residential Customers	Not Applicable
5	All Other Industries	Not Applicable

Appendix G: Energy Security Education

For information on ways to improve household energy efficiency, or information on Western Australia's energy security please visit the following sites:

- Energy Policy WA ([wa.gov.au/organisation/energy-policy-wa](https://www.wa.gov.au/organisation/energy-policy-wa))
- Department of Climate Change, Energy, Environment and Water (Commonwealth) ([energy.gov.au](https://www.energy.gov.au))
- The Australian Energy Market Operator ([wa.aemo.com.au](https://www.wa.aemo.com.au))
- Department of Transport (transport.wa.gov.au)
- Emergency WA (emergency.wa.gov.au)
- DEMIRS - Building and Energy Division (commerce.wa.gov.au/building-and-energy)
- Department of Water and Environmental Regulation (der.wa.gov.au)
- Department of Fire and Emergency Services (dfes.wa.gov.au)
- Department of Health (health.wa.gov.au) / Healthy WA (healthywa.wa.gov.au)
- Horizon Power (horizonpower.com.au)
- Department of Energy, Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety (demirs.wa.gov.au)
- State Emergency Management Committee (www.wa.gov.au)
- RAC (rac.com.au)
- Synergy (synergy.net.au)
- Western Power (westernpower.com.au)
- DEMIRS - WorkSafe (commerce.wa.gov.au/worksafe)
- Australian Red Cross (redcross.org.au/prepare)

The HMA recommends all consumers note the Department of Fire and Emergency Services information on being prepared for natural hazards or other emergencies. The items contained within an [emergency kit](#) will assist households during energy supply disruptions.

